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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.1 The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has a public commitment to evaluate 
each year at least one of its previous interventions. These evaluations 
help us to understand whether and how our projects have achieved the 
desired impact, and whether the outcomes could be further improved. 
The OFT relies on findings from such evaluations to learn lessons that 
can be applied to future comparable interventions. 
1.2 In this context, the OFT’s evaluation team has evaluated the impact of 
the intervention addressing the anti-competitive practice of 50 
independent fee-paying schools in the setting of fees during academic 
years 2001/02 to 2003/04. This research has been carried out by OFT 
economists and independently reviewed by Professor Stephen Davies.1
1.3 The main aim is to understand whether the OFT intervention had an 
impact, and to estimate this impact in terms of reduced school fees. To 
do so we have collected data on the evolution of school fees and other 
variables before and after the OFT’s intervention. 
 
Background  
1.4 For the academic years 2001/02 – after the Competition Act came into 
force – to 2003/04, the OFT held that the exchange of future pricing 
information between the Sevenoaks Survey schools ‘had as its object 
the distortion of competition within the United Kingdom’.2
1.5 The schools concerned had exchanged information relating to their 
intended fee increases and fee levels for boarding and day pupils in 
relation to the academic years 2001/02, 2002/03 and 2003/04. The 
 It was not 
necessary therefore for the OFT to come to a conclusion as to whether 
the information exchange had an anti-competitive effect. 
1 Stephen Davies is Professor of Economics at the University of East Anglia 
2 OFT (2006) ‘Exchange of Information on Future Fees by Certain Independent, Fee–Paying 
Schools’, (See paragraph 1402) 
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information was exchanged through a survey, known as the 'Sevenoaks 
Survey'. Between February and June of each year, the schools 
concerned gave details of their intended fee increases and fee levels for 
the academic year beginning in September. Sevenoaks then collated that 
information and circulated it, in the form of tables, to the schools 
concerned. The information in the tables was updated and circulated 
between four and six times each year as schools developed their fee 
increase proposals in the course of their annual budgetary processes. 
1.6 The key features of the infringement that were instrumental in the OFT’s 
assessment of the information exchange as an object offence included: 
• The information that was exchanged related to future intentions of 
price, and was confidential and not publicly available. 
• It was done on a regular and highly systematic basis, and for a 
number of years. 
• The timing of the exchange corresponded with the timing in which 
school fees for the following year were set. 
1.7 The economic literature suggests that the exchange of future 
confidential pricing intentions is likely to result in harm for consumers 
and reduce overall welfare. The primary way in which this can happen is 
through the facilitation of coordination. Market participants coordinating 
either explicitly or tacitly over prices may be able to charge higher prices 
for the goods and services they supply. 
1.8 In theory, the exchange of confidential future information about changes 
in school fees may have resulted in higher school fees. If the OFT’s 
intervention in stopping the information exchange did have an impact, 
we would expect this to be manifest in a reduction of school fees 
compared with the counterfactual of no OFT intervention. Therefore, the 
primary focus of the analysis in this report is on identifying whether 
there is evidence that school fees have fallen as a result of the 
intervention. 
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Methodology 
1.9 This evaluation has relied principally on data on school fees, rankings 
and other characteristics from online ‘FT 500’3 annual rankings and from 
the ‘Best-Schools’4
1.10 We have analysed fees data over time, looking at the evolution of fee 
levels and annual fee changes for the schools involved in the Sevenoaks 
Survey (‘SS Schools’) before and after the OFT’s intervention. To control 
for other factors that may also have had an impact on the determination 
of fee setting, most notably the economic downturn, we have been able 
to compare fees to those set by a sub-group of schools not involved in 
the Sevenoaks Survey (‘Non-SS Schools’). Further, we have used 
‘difference-in-differences’ econometric analysis to exploit the Non-SS 
Schools as a control group in testing whether the intervention had a 
statistically significant impact on the fees that the SS Schools charged. 
 datasets. 
Empirical findings 
1.11 The key finding of the econometric analysis is that since OFT 
intervention, boarding fees have been on average 1.6 per cent lower, 
and day fees 1.5 per cent lower, than we would expect in absence of 
intervention. The result for boarding fees is statistically significant at the 
95 per cent level, and robust to a range of sensitivity checks. The result 
for day fees was less statistically significant5
1.12 We have used the results of the econometric analysis to present best 
estimates of benefits to the consumer arising from lower school fees. 
 and less robust to 
sensitivity checks. 
3 FT annual rankings are found for instance here: www.ft.com/reports/schools2006  
4 See www.Best-Schools.co.uk   
5 The boarding fees findings are statistically significant at the 95 per cent level (meaning there is 
less than a five per cent probability that there was no effect). The day fees findings are only 
statistically significant at the 90 per cent level, and unlike the boarding fees results are not 
robust to sensitivity tests. 
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Total discounted savings to the consumer6
• £85m in boarding fees 
 can be estimated (in 2010 
prices, discounted to the present) as 
• £20m in day fees. 
1.13 Given the high degree of confidence placed in the findings in relation to 
boarding fees, the analysis therefore suggests that OFT intervention has 
realised savings of at least £85m to the consumer in the post-
intervention period 2004/05 to the present, equating to average savings 
of £495 per boarder per annum. 
1.14 There are a number of reasons for regarding the estimate of consumer 
savings as conservative. The first is that, in using the Non-SS Schools as 
a control group for the econometric analysis, we have implicitly assumed 
that this group was not impacted by the OFT intervention. We consider 
that this assumption supports the conservativeness of the estimate on 
the grounds that the OFT intervention is likely to have had an indirect 
impact on the Non-SS Schools, as we would expect the majority of them 
to be in competition with SS Schools. To the extent that the OFT 
intervention led to a reduction in SS Schools fees, we would expect 
competition between SS Schools and Non-SS Schools to create 
incentives for Non-SS Schools – and other independent fee-paying 
schools not considered in this analysis – to respond by in turn lowering 
their own fees. A second reason is that to the extent that OFT 
intervention had an industry-wide effect, the difference in differences 
methodology will underestimate the impact of intervention in lowering 
fees of SS Schools. 
1.15 In relation to the two reasons above, we note that average annual real 
fee changes decreased significantly and steadily following OFT 
intervention for both SS Schools and Non-SS Schools, from 
approximately seven per cent during the infringement to four per cent in 
6 See Annexe F for calculation of point estimate and range of consumer benefits. 
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the four-year period immediately after intervention (before the onset of 
the financial crisis and recession). While this may be explained by other 
factors, it would also be consistent with a broad cross-industry impact 
of OFT intervention.  
1.16 The third reason is that the analysis does not attempt to quantify the 
deadweight loss averted of OFT intervention,7 focusing only on the 
transfer of surplus back from schools to the consumer. The final reason 
is that the estimate does not take account of the wider deterrence 
effects of this competition enforcement action across the economy. In 
this respect, the OFT has published previous research which finds 
evidence of significant deterrent effects.8
7 See Annexe F for discussion of estimation of deadweight loss averted. 
 
8 OFT (2011) ‘The Impact of Competition Interventions on Compliance and Deterrence’ 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1391.pdf. The research identifies 
and quantifies the wider benefits and costs associated with deterrence resulting from 
enforcement activities undertaken by the OFT. For every case investigated it estimates 
deterrence ratios of 40 in relation to ‘other commercial agreements’ (including information 
exchange).  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
Objectives of the research 
2.1 This report considers the impact of the OFT intervention addressing the 
anti-competitive conduct of 50 independent fee-paying schools, who 
shared information concerning the setting of fees during academic years 
2001/02 to 2003/04. The objective of the evaluation is to understand 
whether and how the intervention had an impact, and to ensure that 
lessons are learned for future interventions. The paper focuses 
predominately on the impact of the OFT’s investigation on prices 
(‘fees’). 
Background  
2.2 The OFT held that the exchange of future pricing information between 
the Sevenoaks Survey schools for the academic years between 2001/02 
– after the Competition Act came into force – and 2003/04, ‘had as its 
object the distortion of competition within the United Kingdom’.9
2.3 The schools concerned had exchanged information relating to their 
intended fee increases and fee levels for boarding and day pupils. The 
information was exchanged through a survey, known as the 'Sevenoaks 
Survey'. 
 It was 
not necessary therefore for the OFT separately to assess and come to a 
conclusion as to whether the information exchange had an anti-
competitive effect. 
2.4 Each year from 1997 until June 2003, the Sevenoaks bursar requested 
and received fee increase information from up to 49 other independent 
fee–paying schools (see Annexe A for a table of Participant schools). 
The information, which was collated into the format of a spread-sheet, 
listed individual schools' fee increases and fee levels for the coming 
academic year, identifying them as ‘fixed’ or ‘estimated’. 
9 See paragraph 1402 of the Decision  
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2.5 Between February and June of each year, the schools concerned gave 
details of their intended fee increases and fee levels for the academic 
year beginning in September. Sevenoaks then collated that information 
and circulated it, in the form of tables, to the schools concerned. The 
information in the tables was updated and circulated between four and 
six times each year as schools developed their fee increase proposals in 
the course of their annual budgetary processes. Additional circulations 
took account of revised or new submissions from the Participant schools 
as their proposed fee calculations evolved during each of their respective 
budgetary processes. Typically, a final iteration was circulated in May or 
June, just as schools were finalising fees. 
2.6 Figure 1 shows the recorded circulation dates of the survey in each year 
of the infringement. It shows that the survey was circulated at least four 
times each year in the run-up to the setting of fees for the academic 
years 2001/02 to 2003/04. This compares with the 1997/98 to 
2000/01 period when it is reported there were usually two circulations 
per academic year, one in February and one in May.10
Figure 1: Recorded circulation dates of the Sevenoaks Survey 
 
 
10 See Paragraph 320 of the Decision 
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2.7 The key features of the infringement that were instrumental in its 
assessment as an object offence include: 
• The information that was exchanged related to future intentions of 
price, and was confidential and not publicly available. In this 
respect the OFT noted in particular ‘it is hard to envisage what 
legitimate purpose could be served by the exchange of such 
information, in particular in circumstances where the information 
remains otherwise confidential and is not shared with customers’. 
• It was done on a regular and highly systematic basis, and for a 
number of years. 
• The timing of the exchange corresponded with the timing in which 
school fees for the following year were set. 
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3 THEORY, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Theory 
3.1 Profit maximising firms have an incentive11 to coordinate across the 
industry on a jointly profit maximising price structure: by restricting 
competition and raising prices across the industry towards the monopoly 
profit maximising level, participating firms can extract greater rents.12
3.2 The economic literature suggests that the primary way in which the 
exchange of certain types of information between competitors is likely to 
result in harm for consumers and reduce overall welfare is through the 
facilitation of coordination. Information exchange makes it easier to 
establish and sustain tacit or explicit coordinated behaviour, and so may 
allow for higher prices to be charged for the goods and services. 
 
However, as the effect of such coordination is a loss of welfare to the 
consumer – these practices are for this reason deemed anti-competitive 
and prohibited by the Competition Act 1998.  
3.3 The extent to which information exchanges can lead to adverse effects 
for consumer and welfare depends both on the form of the information 
exchanged and the frequency of the exchange. 
3.4 In relation to the form of information exchanged: 
• Individualised information exchange facilitates coordination by 
enabling monitoring and identification of deviations. In contrast, 
exchange of aggregated information does not allow for such exact 
monitoring, and is therefore less likely to facilitate such 
coordination. 
11 The incentive to coordinate is influenced by market conditions, such as concentration, 
symmetry, product homogeneity, buyer power, ease of entry, and how parties discount the 
future.  
12 Charities may be subject to the same incentives to the extent that they aim to generate a 
surplus when setting prices. 
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• Exchange of private information has more potential for harm than 
public, as public data is already available to all market players and is 
less likely to be of strategic nature. 
• Exchange of information on future intentions carries the risk – more 
so than exchange of historic information – of helping firms to arrive 
at future focal points, by diminishing the risk of losing sales when 
enacting them. 
• Exchange of individualised, future pricing information is more likely 
to lead to collusive outcomes than say exchange of cost 
information, which could even promote the sharing of cost 
efficiencies. 
3.5 In the case of the Sevenoaks Survey, the information exchanged related 
to future fee intentions which were confidential and not publicly 
available. This form of information exchange is particularly useful for 
facilitating coordination over prices and so is most likely to be harmful to 
consumers. 
3.6 The harm associated with the frequency of the information exchange is 
related to the frequency with which prices are set and the length of 
contracts. Information that is exchanged sufficiently frequently to enable 
coordination in each iteration of the price-setting process has more 
potential for facilitating coordination than a frequency that does not. As 
frequency is further increased, this enables further fine-tuning in the 
coordinated price setting process, and further potential for harm. In the 
case of the SS schools, the exchange was done on a highly systematic 
and regular basis at the time when schools were to set fees for the next 
school year. 
3.7 A principal way in which the sharing of strategic pricing information can 
facilitate coordination and thereby engenders harm is through helping 
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market participants to reach a focal point.13 It can do this by allowing 
competitors to communicate where they would like to be, without 
actually having to commit to the price.14
3.8 Emails in the Sevenoaks Survey suggest that focal points – if they 
existed – may have included the average increase in fees of the 
participant schools.
 For example, firm A might want 
to increase prices but is unsure how firms B and C will react. By 
communicating the intended price increase, and observing firm B and C’s 
intentions, firm A can determine whether firms B and C will follow. This 
is important for firm A because it would risk losing market share and 
profits when it implemented the price increase if firm B (and/or C) did 
not increase prices. 
15
'The Governors reviewed the Sketch budget for the financial year 
ending 30 June 2002. The major assumptions underpinning the 
budget were the fee and salary increases. 
 In internal emails, the Decision shows at least eight 
different schools referring to the average increase in fees across the 
surveyed schools in the process of setting their own fees. Minutes of an 
internal meeting of school Governors reproduced in the OFT Decision 
offer a vivid example of how the exchange of such information may have 
led to higher fees than would otherwise have been the case. 
The fee assumption was for an increase in the School of 5.5%. 
Since this assumption was made, it had become apparent that other 
schools were considering significantly higher increases, certainly in 
the range 6–8%, this largely engendered by above inflation increases 
13 See for example Stigler, G (1961) ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’ Journal of Political Economy 72(1), 
pp 44, 45–46, and Scherer, F, and Ross, D (1990) Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 3rd edn), pp 265 
14 Bennett et al, (2010) ‘The Law and Economics of Information Sharing: The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly’, European Competition Journal 
15 See the Decision  
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in the State sector coupled to the introduction of performance 
related pay… 
... Decisions. It was agreed that: 
a. The budget for 2001/2002 must be referred back to the F&GPC at 
their meeting on 18 May but in the meantime, the Chairman should 
write to parents to say that the termly boarding fee for the next 
academic year would be of the order of £5,900, ie 8.2%. This would 
give the F&GPC some room for manoeuvre when addressing the 
budget…'16
3.9 Besides making it easier to establish coordinated behaviour in the first 
place, economic theory predicts that, where a certain extent of 
coordination is already present, information sharing can  
 
• facilitate internal stability of coordination, by enabling the 
monitoring of competitors and formulation of precise punishments 
• facilitate external stability of collusion by helping to detect new 
market entrants and coordinate against them. 
3.10 These latter aspects are less relevant in this case. The ability to monitor 
was already enabled by the fact that actual fees were publicly 
observable once set, and the threat from any new entrant was relatively 
weak in such an un-concentrated market. They are therefore not 
discussed in more detail.17
3.11 To summarise, the economic literature suggests that the exchange of 
confidential future information may result in higher prices than would 
otherwise be the case. Therefore, if the OFT’s intervention in stopping 
the information exchange was effective, we would expect this to be 
 
16 See paragraph 977 of the Decision (our emphasis added) 
17 For a discussion see Bennett, M et al, (2010) ‘The Law and Economics of Information Sharing: 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, European Competition Journal 
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manifest in lower school fees. Therefore, the primary focus of the 
subsequent analysis is on identifying whether there is evidence that 
school fees have fallen as a result of the intervention compared to the 
counterfactual of ‘no OFT intervention’. 
Methodology 
3.12 The primary focus of the analysis is on whether the OFT intervention had 
an impact on the level of SS School fees. As a first step in this analysis, 
we can simply compare fees before and after the OFT intervention at the 
participating schools. Any reduction in the fee levels we observe may be 
explained (at least partly) by the OFT’s intervention. To facilitate this, 
we define two time periods: 
• pre-OFT intervention: academic years 2001/02 to 2003/04, and 
• post-OFT intervention: academic years 2004/05 to 2011/12. 
3.13 This before and after comparison considers both differences in fee levels 
pre and post intervention and differences in annual fee changes. As 
noted above, given the nature of the exchange, annual fee increases 
appear more likely to have constituted focal points than the fee levels 
themselves. 
3.14 To control for other factors that may also have had an impact on the 
determination of fee setting, we have been able to compare fees to 
those set by a sub-group of schools not involved in the Sevenoaks 
Survey (‘Non-SS Schools’). Non-SS Schools are the 178 schools from 
the Best-Schools dataset from 2006/07 that were not party to the 
infringement. Non-SS Schools are listed in Annexe A. 
3.15 We have used ‘difference-in-differences’ econometric analysis using the 
Non-SS Schools as a control group to test whether the intervention had 
a statistically significant impact on the fees that the SS Schools charged. 
This technique builds on the assumption that while all of these schools 
are likely to share broadly the same exogenous influences over time, 
only SS Schools were subject to the OFT intervention. Difference in 
differences analysis allows for an assessment of the impact of the 
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intervention by considering the difference between how the treatment 
group (SS Schools) and the control group (Non-SS schools) have 
changed fee-setting after the OFT intervention. It is discussed in more 
detail in Annexe D. 
3.16 Difference in difference analysis relies on two key assumptions. The first 
is that schools in the control group were not affected by the OFT 
intervention. This may be an appropriate starting point, but has the 
potential to be misleading in the event that either of the following effects 
materialise 
• Indirect impact: we would expect the majority of non-SS schools to 
be in Bertrand (price) competition with SS Schools. This could entail 
for example SS Schools serving as price leaders by acting as 
reference points to Non-SS Schools. If the OFT intervention 
prompted SS Schools to reduce fees, we would expect competition 
between SS and Non-SS schools to create incentives for Non-SS 
Schools also to reduce fees. 
• Direct impact: hypothetically, OFT intervention could have 
stimulated compliance more broadly across the rest of the market. 
3.17 To the extent that the control group is directly or indirectly affected by 
the intervention, as through the possible mechanisms outlined above, the 
difference in differences technique will, if anything, underestimate the 
impact of the intervention. Thus, any impact identified by this analysis 
may be considered as erring on conservative. 
3.18 The second assumption – necessary for the causal identification of the 
intervention impact – is that Non-SS Schools are not subject to different 
trends and influences that are not accounted for in the econometric 
specification. This encompasses an assumption that variations in 
economic growth over time do not impact the two groups differently 
over time, which in turn largely depends on potential differences in 
income elasticity of demand between SS Schools and Non-SS Schools. 
Important considerations in this respect include that 
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• On average SS Schools charge higher fees than Non-SS Schools,18
• SS Schools include many of the UK’s most prestigious schools, and 
so could plausibly face the less price sensitive portion of demand. 
This would translate into lower price elasticity for SS Schools 
compared to Non-SS Schools. If so, an economic down-turn for 
instance could be expected to have a lesser impact on SS Schools 
than on Non-SS Schools. 
 
and as a result may price at the more elastic end of the demand 
curve (if linear). If so, an economic down-turn for instance could be 
expected to have a greater impact on SS Schools than Non-SS 
Schools. 
3.19 This analysis takes as a starting point that these considerations – should 
they materialise – may effectively counterbalance each other out. 
Sensitivity tests are conducted later to probe the robustness of the 
results when gross disposable income per head is allowed to influence 
SS Schools and Non-SS Schools differently. 
3.20 This study first employs descriptive analysis to give an introductory 
overview of the data, before proceeding to more rigorous econometric 
techniques. The descriptive analysis facilitates visual inspection of the 
data. The econometric analysis tests the effect of the OFT intervention, 
controlling for the presence of other factors. This allows for a more 
rigorous identification of the impact of the OFT’s intervention. In 
particular the analysis seeks to identify an impact of intervention on 
• fee levels 
– of SS Schools – whether they fall after OFT intervention 
– of the difference between SS School fees and Non-SS Schools 
– whether this difference falls after OFT intervention 
18 SS Schools average fees were for instance £1000 higher per term for boarders in 2003/04 
than for Non-SS Schools 
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• annual fee increases 
– of SS Schools – whether they fall after OFT intervention  
– of the difference between SS Schools and Non-SS Schools – 
whether this difference falls after OFT intervention. 
Data 
3.21 To ensure comprehensive and accuracy, fees data for schools were 
compiled from two sources ‘FT 500’19 annual rankings and the ‘Best-
Schools’20
3.22 Merging the FT and Best-Schools datasets necessitated restricting the 
sample of Non-SS Schools to the sample of the smaller dataset.
 datasets. Potential concerns that spurious results could be 
driven by differences in measurement between the datasets were allayed 
by sensitivity tests – restricting the time period so that only FT datasets 
were used – which showed that findings of the analysis were not 
sensitive to the merging of the two datasets. 
21 Fees 
data were thus collected for all 50 SS Schools, and for 178 Non-SS 
Schools.22 FT data were also collected for other variables for each 
school, including FT rank, number of pupils, proportion of boarders and 
region.23 This was supplemented with GDP deflator data24
19 FT annual rankings are found for instance here: 
 to allow fees 
www.ft.com/reports/schools2006  
20 See www.Best-Schools.co.uk  
21 It was felt that this need not raise sample selection issues, as the Best Schools dataset is 
composed of SS Schools and (arguably) their chief competitors, thereby aiding the process of 
identifying the appropriate counterfactual group. 
22 See Annexe B for overview of independent schools market 
23 Not accounting for gaps, it is estimated that raw data points in the dataset exceed 25,000. 
24 www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_gdp_fig.htm 
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to be adjusted for inflation, as well as gross disposable income per head 
data25
3.23 There were, however, many gaps in the data. This meant that in each 
year, information on some schools was lacking, and that for many 
schools a complete time series of fees covering the entire eleven 
academic years was not available. In the analysis therefore where data 
were lacking for any variable during any given year, that data point was 
excluded from the analysis.
 for sensitivity analysis. 
26 This problem, common in panel estimation, 
need not cast doubts concerning the reliability of the results.27




26 We assume in the analysis that data gaps are random, uncorrelated with fees or any other 
variable, and therefore will not lead to selection bias. This assumption seems reasonable given 
the correlation coefficient between average boarding (day) fee over the time period and number 
of fee data-points is 0.09 (0.06) for SS Schools and 0.15 (-0.09) for Non-SS Schools. 
27 The missing values are uncorrelated with any of the measured variables and hence the results 
are not directly impacted. See Annexe D for more detail. 
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4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Fee levels and annual fee increases 
4.1 Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot average deflated fees per term for SS and 
Non-SS Schools for boarders and day pupils over time. For both charts, 
the blue line shows the evolution of fees over 2001/02 to 2011/12 for 
SS Schools. The red line shows the evolution of fees for Non-SS Schools 
over 2001/02 to 2011/12. The grey vertical line marks the OFT 
intervention. 
Figure 2: Average fees per term (boarding, deflated) 
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Figure 3; Average fees per term (day, deflated) 
 
4.2 Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that  
• Average boarding prices per term are typically about £1,000 higher 
for SS Schools than for Non-SS Schools. The difference is £1,500-
£2,000 for day prices. 
• Boarding prices are typically between £2,000-£4,000 higher than 
day prices. 
• Visual inspection does not enable detection of a change in the 
difference in price levels between SS Schools and Non-SS Schools 
post-intervention. 
• There is no discernible change in the trend of price levels for either 
group following the OFT intervention. 
4.3 Figure 4 and Figure 5 below plot the average annual increase in deflated 
fees per term for boarding and day pupils. The grey vertical lines mark 
the OFT intervention. SS Schools data pre-2001 is presented to provide 
further context. 
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Figure 4: Average annual increase in deflated boarding fees per term (per cent) 
 
Figure 5: Average annual increase in deflated day fees per term (per cent) 
 
4.4 Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that 
OFT1416   |  20
• Annual price increases decreased significantly after the OFT 
intervention for both SS and Non-SS Schools. 
• Annual price increases are remarkably similar between SS and Non-
SS Schools over time. It is hard to discern a clear impact of the 
OFT intervention on SS Schools relative to Non-SS Schools by mere 
visual inspection. Price increases could be grouped into three 
periods: 
o pre-intervention by OFT, when price increases were typically 
around six to eight per cent 
o in the four years immediately after OFT-intervention, when price 
increases were typically around three to five per cent 
o the most recent four years – corresponding with the financial 
crisis – when price increases reduced significantly, falling below 
zero in 2010/11 before recovering the following year. 
4.5 The sudden drop in fees inflation of both SS Schools and Non-SS 
Schools immediately after OFT intervention is a reminder of the 
possibility that an impact may have been felt across the whole industry 
– including both SS Schools and Non-SS Schools. As previously 
outlined, this could occur for instance if the re-invigoration of 
competition among SS Schools were to stimulate competitive responses 
across other schools. Descriptive analysis however cannot assess the 
importance of the OFT intervention in stimulating this reduction: further 
econometric analysis would be required.28
28 And not difference in differences. 
 This paper therefore does not 
draw any firm conclusions from the notable drop in fees inflation in 
2004/05, but notes that to the extent OFT intervention may have 
stimulated a broader cross-industry impact, the difference in difference 
analysis that follows may underestimate the impact of the intervention, 
and could therefore be considered a conservative estimate of impact. 
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5 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
5.1 Econometric analysis, using difference in differences methodology, 
allows for more rigorous interrogation of the data. The model and 
findings are outlined below. See Annexe D for a technical overview. 
Model  
General approach 
5.2 Regression analysis is a statistical method for understanding the 
relationship between two or more variables. Multiple regression analysis 
concerns a variable to be explained, the dependent variable, and one or 
more explanatory variables that are thought to produce or be associated 
with changes in the dependent variable. Regression analysis allows the 
effect of a change in an explanatory variable on the dependent variable 
to be measured, while controlling for the influence of the other 
explanatory variables. For example, in this context, we can find the 
impact of the intervention, while controlling for other relationships 
present in the data. 
5.3 Panel data is produced when a number of individual units (schools in this 
case) are observed over a period of time. The advantage of panel data 
regression models is that they can exploit both the variation across time 
periods, for a given unit, and variation across individual units for each 
given point in time. 
5.4 The panel structure of the data set can be exploited using different 
assumptions concerning the distribution of the error term. In general, 
practitioners can choose between unstructured methods, such as pooled 
cross-section, where no specific assumptions are made, and more 
structured ones, such as fixed effect and random effects. 
5.5 The advantage of fixed and random effects models, compared to cross-
sectional approaches, is that they reduce to the minimum the amount of 
information required to control for differences across SS Schools. 
Random effects models rely on strict assumptions, which would not be 
met in this case. Therefore a fixed effect model is used. A fixed effects 
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model estimates the impact of the explanatory variables by relying 
exclusively on the co-variation between the fees and these explanatory 
variables over time within schools. See Annexe D for further detail. 
Econometric model 
5.6 This analysis uses a panel of yearly, school-level data on fees to 
estimate a fixed effects model. The below econometric model is 
estimated: log(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1.𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3. log (𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4.𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+ 𝜆. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛿. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒.𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
5.7 In short, this model assumes that fees in school i in year t depend on the 
percentage of boarding students, the ranking relative to other 
independent schools, the number of students, the year, whether or not it 
is the post intervention period, whether the school was a party to the 
collusive conduct, and whether or not the observation relates to a 
participating school in the post-intervention period. It estimates the 
impact of each of these factors on fees. As the purpose of the analysis 
is to test whether the intervention had an effect on fees in SS Schools, 
the key variable of interest is 𝛿. Specifically, we are interested in 
whether or not it is significantly different from zero. Annexe D contains 
further detail on the model. The next section has more detail on the 
variables. 
Variable 
• 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡 , the dependent variable, is the fee for school i in year t. 
Inflation adjusted day and boarding fees are used as the dependent 
variable. 
• 𝛽0 is a constant. 
• 𝑆𝑖 is the average value of the fixed effects for each school i. It 
accounts for any school specific time invariant factors that 
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distinguish schools from the average29
• 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟%𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of boarders in school i in year t. For 
example, a school with 75 per cent boarders would have a value of 
0.75. 
. It can be thought of a 
school-specific adjustment to the constant. 
• 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 %𝑖𝑡 is the percentile in the Financial Times school rankings 
for school i in year t. For example, if a school had a ranking in year 
t which put them at the 80th percentile this variable would equal 
0.8. 
• 𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑡 is the number of pupils in school i in year t. 
• 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is the relevant year and accounts for any linear trend in fees. 
• 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 indicates whether or not the observation comes 
from the post-intervention period and allows for the trend, for all 
schools, to differ before and after the intervention. 
• 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 indicates whether or not the observation is from an 
SS School in the post intervention period.30
29 This may capture for instance historical factors or any other factor affecting the average level 
of the fee observed for each school. It will also include whether the school was among the 
group engaged in the collusive practice, as this is also time invariant. 
 Under specific 
assumptions concerning the scope and the duration of the anti-
competitive agreement, the estimated result for this variable can 
provide a basis on which to estimate the impact of the OFT 
intervention. This is the pivotal variable in the difference in 
difference approach. A negative and statistically significant 
coefficient would suggest, consistent with theory that the 
intervention led to a reduction in fees. 
30 For simplicity, the two SS Schools which were not found to have breached the law during the 
academic year 2002/03 are modelled as being party to the collusive conduct this year. 
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• 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the random error associated with school i at time t. 
Assumptions 
5.8 Key assumptions of the fixed effects model and our application of 
difference in differences methodology are 
• The impact of the OFT intervention – if there is one – is best 
modelled as a percentage reduction in fees, beginning in 2004/05. 
– On timing, it is not straightforward to predict whether and at 
what point in time any impact of the OFT intervention would 
occur. It has been argued that cartels can continue as ‘well-
established’ rules even after detection. This suggests that an 
impact might take time to be felt, particularly when practices are 
ingrained, such as through use of rules of thumb or focal points 
which may still be adhered to post-intervention. While the 
assumption of an immediate impact in our model is offered some 
support by evidence to suggest that when the number of parties 
exceeds two, that post-intervention, pre-cartel pricing is quickly 
resumed,31
• In absence of OFT intervention, information exchange and its 
impact would have persisted to the present day (2011/12) 
 we nevertheless conduct tests to explore whether the 
impact of the intervention is gradual. 
31 Kovacic, W, et al (2007) conduct an empirical analysis of a US vitamins cartel and find that 
the number of conspirators may be important in influencing whether prices return to pre-
conspiracy levels, and how quickly this may happen. They find that in the post collusion period, 
products with two conspirators continue to be priced as if explicit conspiracy never stopped, but 
that products with three or four participants quickly return to pre-conspiracy pricing or lower. 
See Kovacic, W, et al (2007) ‘Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartels’ in 
Ghosal, V, and Stennek, J, The Political Economy of Antitrust, Volume 282, pp149-176  
See also Sabbatini P. (2008) ‘Assessing the impact of antitrust intervention by the Italian 
Competition Authority’, De Economist, 156, pp491-505 
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• The FT rank variable is a proxy for the absolute quality of each 
school in a given year (FT score was not used because the score 
methodology changed in 2007, meaning it cannot be used to track 
quality over time32
• Schools other than SS Schools did not engage in similar information 
exchange practices in the first place 
) 
• There are no omitted variables, or other endogeneity issues, which 
would lead to biased results 
– This assumption implies that the only factor that might be 
expected to impact the two groups differently is the 
targeted OFT intervention itself, as any other important 
differences are controlled for with the measured explanatory 
variables 
– As income may be one such variable that may 
influence fee setting differently between SS Schools 
and Non-SS schools, sensitivity tests are performed to 
explore this 
– In reality, the extent to which schools other than SS 
Schools engaged in information exchange pre- and post-OFT 
intervention is unknown, and, by implication, speculative. 
Given that the OFT did not make a finding on the behaviour 
of schools other than the SS Schools, however, this 
simplifying assumption may be considered a suitable 
starting point. To the extent that Non-SS Schools may have 
lowered prices in response to OFT intervention – influenced 
32 See Annexe C for average FT score and average FT rank over time for SS Schools and Non-SS 
Schools. FT rank is defined by the FT as the position of the school, compared to its peers, 
calculated by the FT (based on the FT score).The FT score is defined as a combination of the 
points per candidate in core subjects (to measure the quantity of work), and the points per entry 
in core subjects (to measure the quality). We converted this into a percentile to allow for 
changes in the number of schools ranked over time. 
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by the extent to which OFT intervention enhances 
competition from SS Schools – the difference in differences 
technique may understate the impact of the OFT 
intervention. 
Findings 
5.9 Results of the econometric difference in differences analysis are 
presented in Table 1 below. Although the modelling was performed with 
both real and nominal fees, Table 1 only reports the findings for real 
fees, as there is no substantive difference in the equivalent results for 
nominal fees.33 The left-most column in the table lists the names of the 
coefficient and the columns to the right show the estimated coefficients 
for two versions of the fixed effect model.34
5.10 The key finding is that following OFT intervention, annual school fees of 
infringing schools fell by 1.6 per cent for boarders and 1.5 per cent for 
day pupils compared with the counterfactual of ‘no OFT intervention’. 
Some confidence may be placed in these results.
 Significance is indicated by 
asterisks (*) and crosses (+) as explained at the bottom of the table. 
The bracketed figures below the coefficients are the standard errors. 
35
33 Real fees are preferred as they allow for the time-varying effects of inflation to be accounted 
for. 
 The findings support 
our expectations, based on economic theory, that OFT intervention 
drove a reduction in fees of infringing schools by alleviating the harm 
imposed on the consumer by the original information exchange 
infringement. The analysis suggests therefore that in absence of OFT 
intervention fees would have been 1.6 per cent and 1.5 per cent higher 
34 In order to test robustness two versions of the fixed effects model were run. The first is 
Ordinary Least Squares, and the second is heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation robust (HAC) 
standard errors in order to check for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
35 The findings are statistically significant at the 95 per cent level (boarding) and 90 per cent 
level (day). 
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for boarding and day pupils of SS Schools each academic year from 
2004/05 onwards. 
Table 1: Regression results 













Boarder% 0.0773*** 0.0773+ 0.0367 0.0367 
 (0.018) (0.051) (0.030) (0.029) 
     
Ranking% -0.0147 -0.0147 0.00396 0.00396 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) 
     
Log(Pupils) 0.0247+ 0.0247 0.0291* 0.0291+ 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.017) (0.021) 
     
Year 0.0698*** 0.0698*** 0.0709*** 0.0709*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
     
Post intervention 0.0750*** 0.0750*** 0.0674*** 0.0674*** 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.006) (0.022) 
     
Post intervention and -0.0149** -0.0149** -0.0162** -0.0162*** 
Infringer (DiD) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
N 1829 1825 1317 1311 
R2 0.949 0.949 0.957 0.957 
Standard errors in parentheses   
+ p < 0.2, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Sensitivities and robustness 
5.11 Diagnostic and sensitivity tests are conducted to explore the robustness 
of and determine how confident we can be with these findings. In 
particular to assess the robustness of the findings, various diagnostics 
and sensitivity tests were used to assess the validity of assumptions 
about the modelling of the error term, whether an explanatory variable 
was correlated with the error term, whether the results were impacted if 
regional and national disposable incomes were included as explanatory 
variables and if the results held for sub-samples of the data. Annexe D 
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presents technical details in depth. The results of these tests underline 
the robustness of the findings in relation to boarding fees, showing 
• The impact cannot be explained by a hypothesised difference in 
impact on SS Schools and Non-SS Schools of the financial crisis 
and ensuing recession, as the findings are broadly unchanged when 
the time period is restricted to academic years 2001/02 to 
2007/08.36
• The impact does not depend on the inclusion of the Best-Schools 
dataset: the findings are broadly unchanged when the dataset is 
restricted to the FT dataset by adjusting the time period to 
academic years 2001/02 to 2005/06. This suggests findings are 
not driven by problems with merging the two datasets. 
 This suggests that asymmetric impacts of the recession 
cannot account for the findings. 
• The impact is not sensitive to exclusion of the 10 per cent most 
expensive or 25 per cent least expensive schools. 
• The impact is not sensitive to exclusion of the top 50 ranking 
schools or bottom 200 ranking schools. 
• The impact is not found to be sensitive to inclusion of a disposable 
income variable (regional and national). However, we are unable to 
assess the sensitivity of the results to inclusion of a variable that 
allows gross disposable income per head to impact SS Schools and 
Non-SS Schools differently. See Annexe D. 
5.12 The findings lose their statistical significance when sensitivity tests are 
conducted to exclude Greater London and the South-East (about half of 
total schools sampled). When the sample was restricted only to London 
and the South East, boarding fees were again highly statistically 
36 Academic fees were set for academic year 2007/08 before the financial crisis began. 
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significant (day fees were not), with an estimated effect of a 2.4 per 
cent reduction in fees.37
5.13 We also conducted tests – interacting the time trend and difference in 
difference variable – to explore whether the impact of the intervention is 
gradual or immediate. Results suggest the impact of the intervention 
may be gradual, but the average effect is not materially different. 
 
 
37 The difference between the coefficients obtained on the restricted sample and on the full 
sample however was not statistically significant. Note that although the result indicates that 
London and the South-East play a strong role in driving the result, this does not mean that using 
the average estimated effect across all areas to estimate the consumer detriment avoided would 
lead to inaccuracies in estimating the total national effect. 
Key findings 
• Following OFT intervention, SS School boarding fees fell by an 
estimated 1.6 per cent per annum relative to what we would 
expect had the OFT not intervened. 
• This estimate is highly statistically significant (at the 95 per cent 
level), and robust to a number of different specifications and 
sensitivity tests, and therefore presents strong evidence that OFT 
intervention has driven a reduction in consumer harm. 
• The impact for SS School day fees is estimated at 1.5 per cent per 
annum. This finding, although statistically significant at the 90 per 
cent level, is not as robust as for boarding fees. 
• The findings control for the influence of other factors – for 
instance quality, to the extent that this is captured by the variable 
‘FT rank’ – and are likely to represent a lower bound of impact 
given the potential for broader impact across the market. 
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6 CONCLUSION AND ESTIMATE OF CONSUMER BENEFITS 
6.1 The analysis has presented evidence that suggests OFT intervention 
lowered boarding fees of SS Schools in the post-intervention period 
(2004/05 to the present) by 1.6 per cent. It presented evidence of a 1.5 
per cent reduction in day fees. However, only the findings in relation to 
boarding fees were robust to sensitivity and diagnostic testing. 
6.2 Total discounted savings to the consumer were estimated (in 2010 
prices, discounted to the present) at 
• £85m in boarding fees38
• £20m in day fees. 
  
6.3 Given the high confidence with which the findings are held in relation to 
boarding fees, this analysis has therefore presented evidence that OFT 
intervention has realised savings of an estimated £85m to the consumer. 
This equates to an estimated £495 per boarder per annum.39
6.4 We consider the total estimated savings of £85m to be conservative for 
the following reasons 
 
• The analysis does not attempt to quantify the deadweight loss 
averted by the OFT intervention,40
• The analysis does not account for the possibility of broader impact 
where competitors to SS Schools respond to the reinvigoration of 
SS Schools price competition – as spurred by OFT intervention - by 
lowering their prices. In this regard, it is notable that patterns of 
 focusing only on the transfer of 
surplus back from schools to the consumer. 
38 See Annexe F for calculation of point estimate and range of consumer benefits. 
39 £165 per boarder per term, in 2010 prices, discounted to the present. See Annexe F 
40 See Annexe F for discussion of estimation of deadweight loss averted. 
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annual fee increases show a sizeable reduction in fee inflation 
immediately after OFT intervention – as observed in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 – consistent with an industry-wide effect in terms of 
reduced fees across both SS Schools and Non-SS Schools. 
• The analysis does not consider any impact the OFT intervention 
may have had in stimulating compliance more broadly across the 
rest of the market.  
• The analysis does not take account of the wider deterrence effects 
of this competition enforcement action across the economy. In this 
respect, the OFT has published previous research which finds 
evidence of significant deterrent effects of OFT investigations.41
41 OFT (2011) The Impact of Competition Interventions on Compliance and Deterrence, 
(
 
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1391.pdf) finds during 2003-2011 
for every ‘other commercial agreement’ (including information exchange) investigated by the 
OFT, 40 such agreements are deterred in the rest of the economy. 
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A LIST OF SS SCHOOLS AND NON-SS SCHOOLS 
Table 2: SS Schools 
Ampleforth College Gresham's School Sedbergh School 
Bedford School Haileybury School Sevenoaks School 
Benenden School Harrow School Sherborne School 
Bradfield College King's School Canterbury Shrewsbury School 
Bromsgrove School Lancing College Stowe School 
Bryanston School Malvern College Strathallan School 
Canford School Marlborough College Tonbridge School 
Charterhouse School Millfield School Truro School 
Cheltenham College Mill Hill School Uppingham School 
Cheltenham Ladies' College Oakham School Wellington College 
Clifton College Oundle School Wells Cathedral School 
Cranleigh School Radley College Westminster School 
Dauntsey's School Repton School Winchester College 
Downe House School Royal Hospital School Woldingham School 
Eastbourne College Rugby School Worth School 
Epsom College St Edward's School Oxford Wycombe Abbey School 
Eton College St Leonards-Mayfield School  
 
A.1 Table 3 below lists the Non-SS School monikers used in the dataset, in 
many instances shortened versions of the full school name. 
Table 3: List of Non-SS Schools 
Abbey School Reading Kent College Pembury Rossall 
Abbots Bromley King Edward's School Bath Royal School 
Abbotsholme King Edward's School Royal Ballet School 
Adcote King Edward VI High Girls Royal Grammar School 
Albemarle King Edward VI School Royal Grammar School  
Alleyn's Kingham Royal Masonic School 
Ardingly King's College Royal Russell School 
Arts Educational King's High School Royal Wolverhampton 
Badminton King's School Ely School Of St Helen & St 
Katharine 
Barnard Kingswood Seaford 
Bedstone Lady Eleanor Holles Shebbear 
Blundell's Langley Sherborne School for Girls 
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Bootham Latymer Shiplake 
Bosworth Leighton Shrewsbury High 
Box Hill Licensed Victualler Sidcot 
Bradford Grammar Lime House School Solihull 
Bredon Llandovery South Hampstead High 
Bristol Grammar Lord Wandsworth St Antony's 
Bromley Loughborough High St Bede's 
Bruton Magdalen College St James's School 
Bury Grammar Girls Malvern Girls' St Mary's Hall 
Casterton Manchester Grammar St Albans High 
Channing Manchester High St Albans School 
Chetham's Maynard St Bees School 
Christ College Brecon Merchant Taylors' 
Hertfordshire 
St Catherine's School 
Christ's Hospital Merchiston St Edmund's College 
City of London School for 
Boys 
Milton St George's School 
City of London School for Girls Moira St John's School 
Clayesmore Monkton St Lawrence College 
Cobham Monmouth St Mary's School 
Concord Moreton St Mary's School Ascot 
Culford Mount School York St Mary's School Calne 
Dean Close Northampton High St Paul's Girls' School 
Denstone Norwich School St Peter's School 
Dover Notting Hill St Swithun's School 
D'Overbroeck's Nottingham High School St Teresa's School 
Duke Of York Nottingham High Girls Stonar 
Ellesmere Oratory Surbiton 
Eltham Oswestry Sutton Valence 
Exeter Oxford High School Talbot 
Felsted Pangbourne The Leys School 
Fettes Park School Ilford Tormead 
Framlingham Perse School for Boys Trinity School Devon 
Fyling Perse School for Girls Tudor 
Giggleswick Portsmouth Grammar Twycross 
Godolphin Princess Helena University 
Grange Prior Park College Warminster 
Guildford High Prior's Field School Wentworth 
Haberdashers Boys Purcell Westonbirt 
Haberdashers Girls Putney High Whitgift 
Hammond Queen Anne's Wimbledon High 
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Hampton Queen Elizabeth's Hospital Windermere 
Harrogate Queen Ethelburga's College Wispers 
Headington Queen Margaret's Withington 
Heathfield School Ascot Queen's College Somerset Worksop 
Highgate Queenswood Wrekin 
Hurtwood Read School Wychwood 
James Allen's Girls' School Redland Wycliffe 
John Lyon School Rendcomb  
Kent College Canterbury Roedean  
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B MARKET FOR INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS 
B.1 The UK independent sector educates around 628,000 children in around 
2,600 schools. The independent sector educates around 6.5 per cent of 
the total number of schoolchildren in the UK.42
• pupils aged 11-19 account for 70 per cent of ISC pupils 
 Of the pupils in 
Independent Schools Council (ISC) schools – accounting for around 80 
pre cent of the total number of pupils in independent schools in the UK – 
it is estimated that 
• 68,102 are boarders and 438,398 are day pupils. Boarders thus 
represent about 13 per cent of ISC pupils 
• girls represent 49 per cent of ISC pupils 
• 24,554 pupils are non-British with parents living overseas, 
representing over one third of ISC boarder pupils 
• 45 per cent of ISC schools are in Greater London or the South East. 
 
42 Independent Schools Council www.isc.co.uk/FactsFigures_PupilNumbers.htm. 
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C FT SCORE AND RANK 
Figure 6: Average FT score 
 
Figure 7: Average FT rank 
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C.1 Note that the driving factor behind the improvement in the average Non-
SS rank post-2007 is that many of the lower ranking Non-SS Schools 
drop out of the ranking from this point. 
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D ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Summary 
D.1 Difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis is used to estimate the impact of 
the OFT’s intervention on boarding and day fees in SS schools. Our 
analysis suggests that as a result of the OFT’s intervention, the real 
boarding and day fees in SS schools were about 1.6 per cent and 1.5 
per cent lower in the post intervention period respectively, than would 
have otherwise been expected. Sensitivity testing and diagnostics 
suggest that the results regarding day fees are less robust than the 
results regarding boarding fees. 
Data  
D.2 The dataset has a panel structure, covering about 230 schools between 
2001 and 2011. It contains: 
• day and boarding fees by school charged by each school, either SS 
or non-SS, on a yearly basis 
• scores and rankings from the Financial Times annual comparison of 
independent secondary schools43
• rankings based on those scores 
 in the United Kingdom 
• the location of schools 
• the proportion of boarding students in each school. 
D.3 There are some missing values in the dataset, both in the dependent 
variables – day and boarding fees – and in some of the explanatory 
variables. As these are assumed to be distributed randomly, and in 
43 See the main text for more details. 
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particular uncorrelated with any of the measured variables, the 




D.4 Regression analysis is a statistical method for understanding the 
relationship between two or more variables. Multiple regression analysis 
concerns a variable to be explained, the dependent variable, and one or 
more explanatory variables that are thought to produce or be associated 
with changes in the dependent variable. Regression analysis allows the 
effect of a change in an explanatory variable on the dependent variable 
to be measured, while controlling for the influence of the other 
explanatory variables. For example, in this context, we can find the 
effect of the intervention, while controlling for other relationships 
present in the data. 
 
D.5 Panel data is produced when a number of individual units (schools in this 
case) are observed over a period of time. The advantage of panel data 
regression models is that they can exploit both the variation across time 
periods, for a given unit, and variation across individual units for each 
given point in time. This analysis uses a panel of yearly, school-level 
data on fees to estimate a fixed effects model. 
D.6 The panel structure of the data set can be exploited using different 
assumption concerning the distribution of the error term. In general, 
practitioners can choose between unstructured methods, such as pooled 
44 Specifically, there is assumed to be no sample selection problems resulting from the missing 
data. Sample selection issues arise when the probability of individuals – schools in the present 
exercise – being part of the sample, or missing data, is related to one or more of the variables 
we want explain. This leads to a non-random, non-representative sample from which unbiased 
results cannot be drawn under the current methodology. For more information, see a standard 
econometrics textbook such as Greene (2008) or Kennedy (2008). 
45 Excel 2007 was used to conduct the initial data management and Stata 11 was used to 
conduct the econometric analysis (xtreg for standard FE regression and xtivreg2 for FE 
regression with HAC errors). 
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cross-section, where no specific assumptions are made, and more 
structured ones, as fixed effect and random effects. 
D.7 In this case fixed effect panel estimation was used. This model 
estimates the impact of the explanatory variables on fees by exclusively 
exploiting the co-variation between the fees and these explanatory 
variables over time within schools.46
D.8 Finally, the estimation relies on the assumption that there is no selection 
bias, that is no correlation between the within schools’ variation in fees 
– the variable of interest – or any other regressor and the probability of a 
school being part of the SS group. This is a necessary condition for DiD 
methodology to produce unbiased results. Diagnostic tests on the 
variables used allow us to exclude the possibility that selection bias may 
arise. 
 The advantage of fixed effects 
models, compared to cross-sectional approaches, is that it minimises the 
information required to control for differences across schools. In the 
absence of an adequate control for the heterogeneity between schools 
present in the data, this reduces the risk of obtaining biased results. This 
advantage can come at a cost. Fixed effects models are suitable only if 
there is sufficient time series variation in the data to permit precise 
estimates of the relationship between fees and the explanatory variables. 
In this case both regular and robust standard errors are estimated to 
control for the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the 
error term. 
Econometric model 
D.9 The below econometric model has been designed and estimated. 
46 An often preferable alternative to the fixed effects model is the random effects model, which 
also takes into account the co-variation of these variables across, as well as within schools. A 
random effects model however relies on stronger assumptions than a fixed effect model. A 
Hausman test can be used to formally test whether these assumptions hold, and therefore if a 
random effects model is appropriate. In this case, the Hausman Test indicates these 
assumptions do not hold and that a random effects model is inappropriate. 
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• log(𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1.𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2. 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3. log (𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽4.𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆.𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛿. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒.𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 
• 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡 , the dependent variable, is the fee for school i in year t. 
Inflation adjusted day and boarding fees are used as the dependent 
variable. Nominal fees were deflated with the GDP deflator,47
• 𝛽0 is a constant. 
 and 
2010 prices are used as the base year. The natural log of fees is 
used as this functional form lends itself to a more straightforward 
interpretation in terms of the explanatory variables. Regressions 
were replicated on non-deflated day and boarding fees as a 
robustness test. 
• 𝑆𝑖 the average value of the fixed effects for each school i. The fixed 
effect is the time invariant difference between school i and an 
average school present in the sample. This controls for both the 
impact of observed, time invariant differences, such as location and 
whether the school was among the infringing group,48
• 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟%𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of boarders in school i in year t. For 
example, a school with 75 per cent boarders would have a value of 
0.75. 𝛽2% is the percentage increase (decrease) in fees that could 
be expected from a one per cent increase (decrease) in the number 
of boarders. For example, if 𝛽1 = 0.07 then an increase of one per 
cent in boarders should lead to 0.07 per cent increase in fees. 
 and 
unobserved time-invariant differences between the schools such as 
historical factors. It can be thought of a school-specific adjustment 
to the constant. 
47 www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_gdp_fig.htm 
48 When a fixed effects model is used to conduct DiD analysis, the indicator for the treatment 
group is subsumed into the fixed effect as it is time-invariant. 
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There is no economic presumption concerning the sign of this 
coefficient. 
• 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 %𝑖𝑡 is the percentile in the Financial Times school rankings 
for school i in year t. For example, if a school had a ranking in year 
t which put them at 80th percentile this variable would equal 0.8. 
For consistency across time, it is assumed that there are 500 
comparable schools per year.49
• 𝑃𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑡 is the number of pupils in school i in year t. (𝛽3𝑥100)% is 
the percentage increase (decrease) in fees that could be expected 
from a one per cent increase (decrease) in the number of pupils. As 
with the percentage of boarders, it is not clear whether or not a 
higher number of pupils would be associated with higher or lower 
fees.
 𝛽2% is the percentage increase 
(decrease) in fees that could be expected from a one per cent 
increase (decrease) in the number of boarders. We expect that a 
higher ranking is associated with a higher fee charged by the 
schools. 
50
• 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is the relevant year and accounts for any linear trend in fees. 
It can be considered to incorporate the composite effect of any 
relevant national-level trends over the period. (𝛽4𝑥100)% is the 
percentage change in fees that can be expected each year. Note 
this specification assumes a constant, linear trend. For example, the 
effect on fees of moving from 2002/3 to 2003/4 is assumed to be 
the same as moving from 2004/5 to 2005/6. 
 
• 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an 
observation is in the post intervention period. This variable allows 
49 Therefore the variable is constructed by dividing ranking by 500. 
50 Including contemporaneous volume in a reduced-form regression which has price as the 
dependent variable could, in theory, could lead to endogeneity. However, as discussed in a later 
section of the text, diagnostic testing indicates endogeneity is not present in this case. 
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for the trend, for all schools, to differ before and after the 
intervention. Specifically, 𝜆 is the average difference in fees 
between all schools in the pre and post intervention period, 
controlling for all other explanatory variables, including the linear 
time trend. 
• 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒. 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
observation is from an SS school in the post intervention period. (𝛿𝑥100)% can be interpreted as the average percentage difference 
in fees between the SS schools and non-SS schools in the post-
intervention period, controlling for all other variables in the model 
including the time trend, observed time-variant, school-specific 
characteristics, and observed and unobserved time invariant fixed 
effects. Under specific assumptions concerning the scope and the 
duration of the anti-competitive agreement, the estimated result for 
this variable can provide a basis on which to estimate the impact of 
the OFT intervention. 
• 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the random error associated with school i at time t. 
Hypothesis of interest 
D.10 We are interested in whether or not the intervention had an impact on 
fees when the explanatory variables and time invariant observed and 
unobserved factors are controlled for. In particular, we are interested in 
testing whether or not the intervention had an impact on the fees 
charged by SS schools. 
Results 
D.11 The results are summarised in Table 4. The top row shows the 
dependent variable, the second row shows the estimation method and 
standard errors used. We discuss standard errors further in the next 
section. Only the result for real fees are reported. There is no 
substantive difference in the equivalent results for nominal fees, and it is 
the real fees which are used to estimate consumer detriment avoided. 
The left-most column in the table lists the names of the coefficient and 
the columns to the right show the estimated coefficients for each model. 
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Significance (two-sided difference from zero) is indicated by asterisks (*) 
and crosses (+) as explained at the bottom of the table. The bracketed 
figures below the coefficients are the standard errors. 
Table 4: Regression results 
Dependent Variable Log(Real Day Fees) Log(Real Boarding Fees) 








Boarder% 0.0773*** 0.0773+ 0.0367 0.0367 
 (0.018) (0.051) (0.030) (0.029) 
     
Ranking% -0.0147 -0.0147 0.00396 0.00396 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) 
     
Log(Pupils) 0.0247+ 0.0247 0.0291* 0.0291+ 
 (0.015) (0.033) (0.017) (0.021) 
     
Year 0.0698*** 0.0698*** 0.0709*** 0.0709*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
     
Post intervention 0.0750*** 0.0750*** 0.0674*** 0.0674*** 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.006) (0.022) 
     
Post intervention and -0.0149** -0.0149** -0.0162** -0.0162*** 
Infringer (DiD) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
N 1829 1825 1317 1311 
R2 0.949 0.949 0.957 0.957 
Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p < 0.2, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 , robustness discussed below 
D.12 The large R2 in the final row of Table 4 indicates that the models capture 
much of the variation in the data. 
D.13 The point estimate of the impact of the intervention on is 1.5 per cent 
for day fees and about 1.6 per cent for boarding fees. For both boarding 
and day fees the DiD coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
five per cent level, regardless of whether regular or robust standard 
errors are used. However, diagnostics and sensitivity testing suggest the 
DiD coefficient for day fees is not robust to sub-sampling of the data 
according to the geographical location of the schools. This has no 
material impact on the reliability of the results and is discussed further in 
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Annexe D. While the estimated impact of the intervention may seem 
small, when applied to the relevant schools in the sector the associated 
consumer detriment avoided is economically significant. 
Robustness Tests – Heteroscedascity and autocorrelation 
D.14 Auto-correlation is of particular concern in DiD analysis.51 Diagnostic 
tests indicate heteroscedascity and auto-correlation were both present 
within the model for day and boarding fees. In order to prevent any bias 
in the standard errors, we used heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation 
robust (HAC) standard errors.52
D.15 A further robustness check, to control for the presence of 
autocorrelation, is to collapse the data for each school into pre and post 
intervention periods, re-estimate the model
 Table 1 lists the HAC standard errors 
and shows that the DiD coefficients retain significance when these 
standard errors are used. 
53
D.16 We find it unsurprising that the impact is not robust to the exclusion of 
the yearly linear trend. DiD analysis exploits variation over time to 
identify the effect of the intervention. Collapsing the data discards much 
of the variation which can be used to achieve identification. Therefore, 
this modification does not constitute a parsimonious use of all the 
information available in the data. 
 and see whether 𝛿 remains 
significant. With this approach the estimated DiD coefficient was not 
significantly different from zero for either day or boarding fees. 
D.17 A complementary explanation for this change in significance is that it 
takes time for the intervention to have an impact, and by collapsing the 
51 Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) show many studies which employ difference-in-
difference find spuriously significant results because they fail to properly manage serial 
correlation. 
52 Specifically, the standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors robust to 
heteroscedascity and correlation in the error terms across time and cross-sections. 
53 The year id variable was excluded. 
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data we are not capturing the longer run effect of the intervention. For 
example, the previously co-ordinated price increases could have 
constituted a focal point54 for further price increases for some time after 
the point of intervention. We can test this explanation by including an 
interaction term between the time trend and the difference-in-difference 
dummy in the main model. This allows for the impact of the intervention 
to happen gradually. When the model is re-estimated with this 
interaction term, there is evidence that the effect of the intervention 
does occur gradually, but the resulting average effect is not significantly 
different55
D.18 We can therefore conclude that the loss of significance when the data 
are collapsed is due to the loss of the variation in the time dimension 
which is necessary to achieve identification of the DiD coefficient, and 
not due to the absence of the hypothesised effect. 
 from the one obtained without interacting the variable. 
Robustness Tests – Endogeneity 
D.19 Pupils can be interpreted as the quantity of educational services provided 
for a given fee. Including quantity among the explanatory variables when 
price is the dependent variable may raise fears of endogeneity. A 
Hausman test can be used to test whether there is endogeneity. If the 
number of pupils from the previous year is used as, and assumed to be 
an acceptable instrument for the number of pupils in any given year, the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the error is not rejected. This suggests endogeneity of this variable is not 
54 Motta (2002), for example, discusses the use of focal points, historical or otherwise, in 
sustaining tacit collusion. 
55 The purpose of this regression analysis is to estimate the average effect of the intervention, 
so that it can be used to estimate the consumer detriment avoided. This is not changed by 
including the interaction term. Additionally, this expanded model and its interpretation are more 
complicated than original model. In particular, the calculation of the average effect is more 
complex and less transparent. For these reasons the interaction term is excluded from the main 
model. 
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a problem. This is not very surprising, as the coefficient is of marginal to 
no significance in the various specifications. 
Robustness Tests - Effect of disposable income variables 
D.20 Variation in regional and national disposable income may also affect 
fees. Ideally, these variables would be included in the model. Average 
regional and national disposable income statistics were not available for 
the final two years of the sample at the time the analysis was 
undertaken.56 Therefore the inclusion of these covariates would come at 
the cost of a reduction in the number of observations available for each 
school. When the regional and national disposable income variables were 
included in a regression analysis on a shorter sample which excluded the 
final two years, only one the measure included, the national disposable 
income was significant, with a positive sign.57 This inclusion did not 
materially affect the estimated impact of the intervention, which was 
still significant and no different in statistical terms to original estimate.58
56 Source: Office of National Statistics 
 
In addition, the inclusion did not materially improve the fit of the model. 
Finally, comparisons indicated the reduction in the size of the coefficient 
of interest was largely due to the reduction of the sample used in the 
estimation, rather than to the inclusion of the additional variables. As 
explained above, this is consistent with the fact that the intervention 
had a gradual effect. Therefore removing the last two years from the 
sample would highly likely underestimate the impact of the intervention. 
For this reason, we relied for the computation of savings on the model 
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/regional-accounts/regional-
household-income/march-2011/stb-regional-gdhi-march-2011.html 
57 An alternate model was estimated which included an interaction between the disposable 
income variables and whether or not the school was an infringer. This model should have 
allowed for disposable income to have a different effect on the fees in infringing and non-
infringing schools. Unfortunately, collinearity between the national disposable income and the 
time trend meant it was not possible to effectively differentiate between infringing and non-
infringing schools. 
58 The estimated impact was marginally lower, 0.013 (versus 0.016 in the original model). This 
difference was not statistically significant. 
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which estimated the effect of the intervention on the full time series, 
excluding the disposable income. The fact that the inclusion of additional 
controls, such as the national and regional income, does not materially 
affect the results is a further proof of the robustness of the general 
results of the analysis. 
Robustness Tests – Sub-sampling 
D.21 To ensure the robustness of the results and to explore what drives them, 
we re-estimated the model using seven sub-samples of the data which 
each excluded one of the following categories of data. 
• Schools with an average ranking of worse than 200. 
• Schools with an average ranking of better than 50. 
• Schools whose average real fees are in the top 10 per cent. When 
day fees are the dependent variable, day fees are used, when 
boarding fees are the dependent variable, boarding fees are used. 
• Schools whose fees are in the lower 25 per cent and are not an SS 
school. Again, when day fees are the dependent variable, day fees 
are used, when boarding fees are the dependent variable, boarding 
fees are used. 
• Schools in London and the South East. 
• 2006/07 and subsequent years. 
• 2008/09 and subsequent years. 
D.22 The first four sub-samples should give some indication of whether 
schools with high, or low, fees or rankings are driving the results. The 
exclusion of schools in London and the South East should indicate if they 
are driving the results. The exclusion of data from 2006/7 will help to 
assess whether there is any effect from a change in the source of fee 
data in 2006/7. The exclusion of data from 2008/9 will help to assess 
whether there is any ‘recession effect’. 
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D.23 The DiD coefficient for real day fees did not consistently retain its 
significance in these sub-samples. The DiD coefficient for boarding fees 
was more robust to sub-sampling, and when the HAC standard error was 
used, it retained its significance in all but the sub-sample which excludes 
London and the South East.59
59 This indicates that London and the South-East play a strong role in driving the result, but it is 
do not mean that using the average estimated effect across all areas to apportion out the 
consumer detriment avoided would lead to inaccuracies in estimating the combined national 
effect. 
 Based on these findings, the estimated 
effect of the intervention on boarding, but not the estimated effect on 
day fees, is considered sufficiently robust enough to be used in 
estimation of consumer detriment avoided. 
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E DISPERSION ANALYSIS 
Theory 
E.1 Information exchange also has the potential to reduce the dispersion of 
fees.60
E.2 In the analysis that follows when considering fee dispersion we therefore 
note that while a reduction in fee dispersion suggests an impact of the 
OFT intervention, it does not in itself indicate whether this impact was 
due to the cessation of collusive activity and so pro-competitive. In order 
to assess whether the intervention had a pro-competitive impact we 
need to establish whether there is evidence that fees were reduced as a 
result. This shows the limitations in drawing conclusions on the impact 
of intervention from price dispersion analysis alone. It shows that theory 
is less clear-cut regarding the expected impact of intervention on 
dispersion than it is on price levels and price increases, and underpins 
 However, analysis focused solely on the change in fee dispersion 
before and after the cessation of an exchange of information cannot 
clearly identify whether it had an anti-competitive impact. If the 
information exchange had led to the development and use of focal points 
then variation around these focal points may be limited. If this was the 
case for the SS Schools we might expect the OFT intervention to lead to 
an increase in dispersion and a reduction in fees (or in fee changes). 
However, information exchange may also have the potential to limit 
dispersion for the different reason that competitors are able to use 
information on each other’s pricing to better understand demand and to 
respond more easily to one another’s price changes. If this was the case 
for the SS schools we might expect the intervention to lead to a 
reduction in dispersion though not necessarily to a decrease in fees (or 
fee changes). 
60 If focal points relate to fee levels, then this may limit dispersion of fee levels. If focal points 
relate to percentage annual increase in price then this may limit dispersion of annual price 
increases. The latter seems the more likely in the context of the fee-setting example in 
Paragraph 31 above, which identifies a possible focal range of six to eight per cent in annual fee 
increases. 
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the greater weight placed by this evaluation on analysing price levels and 
increases than on dispersion. 
Methodology 
E.3 Descriptive analysis – presenting average deflated fee levels and 
changes for the control and treatment groups – is used to examine 
dispersion of tuition fees within groups, in particular to explore the 
impact of intervention on 
• dispersion of fee levels61
– of SS Schools – whether this falls after OFT intervention 
 
– of the difference between SS Schools and Non-SS Schools 
over time – whether this falls after OFT intervention 
• dispersion of annual increases in fees62
– of SS Schools – whether this falls after OFT intervention 
  
– of the difference between SS Schools and Non-SS Schools 
– whether this falls after OFT intervention 
Descriptive Analysis 
E.4 Figure 8 and Figure 9 depict the dispersion63
61 Noting the caveat outlined above 
 of fees around the mean for 
boarders and day pupils. The grey vertical lines mark the formal end of 
the anti-competitive practices by SS Schools as a result of OFT 
intervention. 
62 Noting the caveat outlined above 
63 Dispersion is corrected by the factor scaling the mean in any year to the mean in 2001/02 
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Figure 8: Standard deviation of boarding fees (deflated, per term, mean corrected to 2001/02) 
 
Figure 9: Standard deviation of day fees (deflated, per term, mean corrected to 2001/02)  
 
E.5 Figure 8 and Figure 9 show that 
• Variation in dispersion of SS School boarding and day fees does not 
fall dramatically after OFT intervention. 
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• There is not strong evidence that the difference in dispersion 
between the SS Schools and Non-SS Schools falls following OFT 
intervention. 
• For boarding pupils, dispersion is consistently lower for SS Schools 
than Non-SS Schools. The continued low variation in SS Schools 
fees after OFT intervention suggests that if OFT intervention was 
effective in enhancing competition, it is not immediately obvious 
that this was effected by a change in dispersion (though 
econometric analysis might shed more light in this regard). 
E.6 Figure 10 and Figure 11 depict the dispersion of annual fee increases 
around the mean for boarders and day pupils. SS Schools data pre-2001 
is presented to provide further context. The grey vertical lines mark the 
OFT intervention. 
Figure 10: Standard deviation of annual percentage increase in deflated boarding fees   
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Figure 11: Standard deviation of annual percentage increase in deflated day fees 
 
E.7 Figure 10 and Figure 11show that 
• The biggest jump in the dispersion of SS School annual boarding 
fee increases is immediately after OFT intervention, from 1.2 per 
cent to 3.6 per cent. The dispersion for SS Schools is generally 
much lower in the years prior to intervention than after. Both of 
these observations are consistent with an effect of OFT 
intervention on dispersion. 
• While boarding dispersion for SS Schools peaks immediately after 
OFT intervention, for the comparison group – the Non-SS Schools – 
dispersion is at its lowest in the two years after OFT intervention. 
Given that in the rest of the time period, dispersion for Non-SS 
School is generally higher than for SS Schools, the increase in 
dispersion of SS Schools immediately after intervention is all the 
more striking. This is consistent with OFT intervention in particular 
having an effect in driving an increase in SS School dispersion 
immediately after intervention. Two caveats are noted however. 
The first is that such an increase in dispersion immediately post-
intervention is also consistent with the OFT intervention removing a 
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mechanism – information exchange – that allowed for greater 
transparency and a more similar understanding of demand. In this 
interpretation, the increase in dispersion need not be accompanied 
by an improvement in consumer welfare. The second caveat is that 
the great deal of variation in dispersion observed year on year over 
the broader time period suggests caution – based on dispersion 
analysis alone – in attributing with much confidence an effect on or 
through dispersion of OFT intervention. 
• In relation to day fee annual increases, fee dispersion for SS 
Schools falls after OFT intervention, and remains lower in the post-
intervention period than in the pre-intervention period. 
• Dispersion of SS Schools day fee annual increases also remains 
lower than for Non-SS Schools in the post-intervention period. It is 
therefore harder for day fees than for boarding to identify a 
potential effect of OFT intervention in driving greater variation in 
dispersion of annual fee increases. 
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F CONSUMER DETRIMENT AVERTED 
F.1 The analysis has suggested that OFT intervention lowered boarding fees 
by 1.6 per cent in the period from academic year 2004/05 to the 
present. Figure 12 depicts the evolution of actual boarding fees against 
expected evolution of boarding fees had the OFT not intervened, for 
illustrative purposes assuming an immediate and constant effect of OFT 
intervention. The grey line marks the OFT intervention. 
Figure 12: Average annual boarding fees of SS Schools: actual and expected in absence of OFT 
intervention  
 
Surplus – transfer from schools to the consumer 
F.2 The transfer of surplus from schools to the consumer is estimated in 
point estimates of a 1.6 per cent reduction in boarding fees, and a 1.5 
per cent reduction in day fees of SS Schools since OFT intervention. 
This is computed keeping levels of demand unchanged, that is, assuming 
that the number of pupils enrolling was not affected by the level of the 
fee. For simplicity, an immediate and constant impact of OFT 
intervention is assumed. Cumulative savings from 2004/05 to the 
present are calculated as: £85m in boarding fees, and £20m in day fees. 
This estimates the transfer of surplus from schools to the consumer as a 
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result of the elimination of anti-competitive practice following OFT 
intervention (and does not include deadweight loss averted – see 
‘Deadweight loss averted’ in Paragraph F.7 below). 
F.3 Owing to missing data points, the process of calculating fee revenues 
likely underestimates fee revenues by an estimated 10 per cent. 
However the process may also overstate fees revenues by omitting the 
effect of bursaries and scholarships and the potential for lower fees for 
younger students. By not attempting to correct for these opposing 
effects, the analysis assumes that fees revenues are reduced to 90 per 
cent of what they would be in absence of bursaries etc, that is, that 
these effects balance each other out. 
F.4 Figure 13 below shows estimated cumulative consumer savings over 
time. 
Figure 13: Cumulative savings in fees to the consumer from OFT intervention, 2010 prices, £m, 
discounted to present 
 
F.5 Cumulative savings, for a range equating to a 95 per cent confidence 
interval (two standard errors each way), are estimated as lying between 
£12m and £159m for boarding fees. The equivalent range for day fees is 
between £1m to £38m for day fees, and between £13m and £197m in 
total. 
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F.6 Dividing total annual savings in boarding fees by the number of boarders 
gives an average saving of £495 per boarder per annum (2010 prices, 
discounted to present). 
Deadweight loss averted 
F.7 The £85m of savings in boarding fees is an estimate of the consumer 
surplus that following OFT intervention is no longer diverted to SS 
Schools by the anti-competitive practice. This figure does not account 
for the deadweight loss – the extent to which higher prices force some 
consumers out of the market – of the anti-competitive practice. Given 
likely price inelastic demand and the capacity-constrained nature of SS 
Schools, the deadweight loss is likely to be small – particular relative to 
the transfer of consumer surplus, but could nevertheless be in the 
millions of pounds, again underlining the conservative nature of the 
evaluation. 
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